The financial management practices of Infrastructure Funds listed on the ASX have been subject to substantial criticism, particularly in the light of the extremely poor performance of many of the funds in the current financial crisis. It is argued here that some of the practices commonly criticized can be consistent with principles of good financial management -although actual practice has involved deviations from those principles. Since the listed infrastructure fund model is an innovation with many good characteristics, it is important that the failings exposed by the current crisis be correctly identified such that improvements to the model can be effected through better regulation, governance and market discipline.
, brought attention to criticisms of the business and governance models used, and led to decisions by many infrastructure fund operators to make substantial changes in their financial management strategies. 2 Concerns have been raised about a number of interrelated common past practices, upon which this article focuses. 3 One is regular (upward) accounting revaluations of the underlying infrastructure assets for which there is no readily reliable market valuation. A second is the practice of using those higher asset valuations to justify taking on increased external debt and possibly increasing leverage. A third is the practice of paying distributions to investors which exceed accounting earnings or even the operating cash flows of the fund -and, in the latter case, funding those distributions with the proceeds of the debt issues. A number of infrastructure fund operators have recently announced that they will cease the practice of making distributions to investors in excess of earnings, with some suspending distributions in response to the problems posed for them by the financial crisis. This paper argues that the practices described above are not necessarily inconsistent with good financial management of such vehicles for financing and management of infrastructure assets. While there are strong grounds for believing that the governance models and actual management practices have been inadequate 4 there is, in principle, nothing wrong with the practices of asset revaluations, distributions exceeding earnings (or operating cash flows), and external borrowings based on the higher asset valuations. And in the environment created by the sub-prime crisis, there are good reasons for temporarily ceasing those practices, without implying that they are inherently faulty.
Section 1 of this paper briefly outlines how infrastructure funds operate 5 , including a discussion of the popular practice of the use of stapled security structures, and provides information on their recent importance in Australia. Section 2 uses a simple example of an infrastructure asset to demonstrate that the practices outlined above can be consistent with good financial management. Section 3 provides concluding comments in the context of problems identified with the infrastructure fund model in the current financial crisis.
1.

The Infrastructure Fund Model
The infrastructure fund model appears to be an Australian financial innovation popularized initially by Macquarie Bank and subsequently adopted by a number of other investment banks and finance houses such as Babcock and Brown. At April 2008 there were 23 infrastructure funds listed on the ASX with total market capitalization of $42 billion, of which 18 had a structure involving stapled securities.
They are the owner/operators of such assets as pipeline operators, power generators, toll roads, airports etc.
The infrastructure fund involves its promoter acquiring or constructing infrastructure assets which are sold into a trust which raises funds by issue of units to investors. The promoter manages the trust (for a fee), and the trust is generally structured such that it is classified as a non-operating trust. As a result, it is a "pass-through" vehicle for tax purposes -as long as profits are fully distributed to unit holders, no corporate tax is levied.
To achieve the non-operating trust structure, and for other reasons, a stapled security structure, which appears virtually unique to Australia, has become popular. In these cases, in addition to the trust, the fund involves a management company which is a joint stock company. Investors in the fund receive both a unit in the trust and a share in the management company, and those two securities (the unit and the share) are "stapled" together. Stapling means that the securities cannot be separately traded. In some cases, the stapling may also include a debt instrument issued by the trust.
Generally, the bulk of the funds subscribed are allocated to the purchase of the unit in (and debt instrument issued by) the trust. Distributions to investors comprise both dividends paid by the company and distributions paid by the trust.
There is a wide range of structures which can be (and are) adopted. One would involve the trust being the owner of the assets and leasing them to the management company. Of total revenues received by the management company from customers, most is paid as a tax deductible expense in the form of lease payments to the trust.
The residual profits of the management company are subject to company tax and can be paid out to investors as franked dividends. The lease payments it receives can be paid out by the trust as distributions to investors without incurring company tax.
(Some part of the lease payment reflects a return of capital (depreciation) and the remainder is income).
An alternative structure would be for the management company to be the owner of the assets, financing these by borrowings from the trust. A similar outcome occurs, with much of the revenue received by the management company being paid to the trust as interest and repayment of principal, for subsequent distribution to investors. In many of these structures, the management company may be little more than a shell used to hire asset management services from an external company -typically a subsidiary of the fund promoter.
In both structures, the infrastructure assets owned may be held within separate company structures, with the trust or management company having 100 per cent ownership or less (perhaps with the promoter retaining some equity stake). Those asset holding companies can themselves be levered, borrowing from third parties to supplement the funds provided as equity from the infrastructure fund. Generally, the infrastructure funds have been structured by their promoters in such a way as to minimize the ability of investors to exert any effective governance or control. While unit-holders have voting rights in the trust, their ability to replace the management company which is the responsible entity for the trust is constrained by "poison pills" (whereby such a change involves significant financial costs to the fund) and by the existence of special voting shares or "super majority" requirements on votes to change the responsible entity.
In this way, the infrastructure funds have some characteristics of the "private equity" model. The management company appoints directors to the individual asset operating companies, which are not individually subject directly to stock market discipline and threat of takeover. While the stock market price of units in the fund can fluctuate, the governance arrangements limit external influence. However, as some infrastructure fund operators have discovered in the current crisis, high leverage at a time of declining market capitalization has led to lenders exerting significant influence on the funds and management companies.
Financial Management and Infrastructure Funds
Infrastructure assets differ substantially in their operating, risk, and cash flow, characteristics, and are often subject to regulatory oversight under access pricing regulation. Infrastructure funds are structured in a myriad of ways involving collections of infrastructure assets, and tax issues are an important determinant of the specific structures adopted. It is however possible to identify some key features of financial management by use of a simple example which ignores some of these complications.
Consider the case of a simple infrastructure asset, with the characteristics depicted in Table 1 . The asset has a 10 year life, costs $100 to construct, and has initially increasing cash flows over time. At the assumed discount rate of 10 per cent p.a., the asset has a net present value (NPV) prior to construction of $78. Once constructed, and after the first year in which no cash flows are projected, its present value and, we assume, market value will be $186, reflecting the $100 expenditure and the closer proximity of future cash flows. Accounting depreciation on the asset (assuming straight line depreciation) is $10 p.a. and earnings are equal to cash flow less depreciation. In this simplified example, there is no external leverage (and hence no interest and principal repayments to third parties) and no taxation. We do, however, assume that the initial investment by the owners is legally structured as a stapled security consisting of part equity and part debt (for tax reasons). Despite its appearance (and tax treatment) as debt plus equity, stapling means that the whole of the investment has the risk and return characteristics of equity.
Y
Table 1: Simplified Infrastructure Asset: Cash Flows, Earnings and Value
What are the key characteristics of this asset which are relevant for financial management? First, note that projected cash flow exceeds earnings in the initial years.
Second, note that the expected market value of the asset initially increases over time (until year 4 in this example) before declining to zero at the end of its life. Third, if there is some optimal leverage ratio, relative to market value, the increase in the asset's market value, and thus the value of equity, in the initial years requires some replacement of equity with debt. Note that these characteristics relate to expected cash What are the consequences of these characteristics for financial management of the infrastructure asset/fund?
First, there is nothing inappropriate about the fund making distributions to investors which exceed earnings. For a number of years, the fund has cash flow available to do so, and that excess (equal to accounting depreciation in this simple example)
represents return of capital to the investors. Of course, paying out all net operating cash flows to investors means that the fund will need to raise new equity or debt when replacement of the assets is required. But unless investment for replacement of the asset is required at the time that operating cash flows are received, non-distribution would involve the fund building up and investing internal cash balances. Hence, the preferred strategy depends upon the timing of, and optimal strategy for financing, replacement investment or expansion. The view that distributions of free cash flow prevent value destroying investments by over-confident, entrenched, managers 7 , gives further credibility to this strategy.
Second, there is nothing inherently inappropriate about the fund increasing the internally assessed market value of its assets. As Table 1 If optimal capital management involves some target debt/asset ratio (based on the market value of assets), the increase in asset valuation by itself provides justification for the issue of debt and reduction in equity finance. However, the peculiar nature of stapled securities means that the capital restructuring cannot be interpreted simply as an increase in the debt/equity ratio. Where, for example, stapled securities involve both a unit (equity share) in the trust stapled to a debt instrument (sometimes referred to as a loan note), distributions to investors can involve a component which is a repayment of the loan principle. In this case, the new external debt may simply be replacing the debt financing originally provided by investors in the fund. While for tax purposes this leaves the amount of debt financing unchanged, the fund's "external leverage" has been increased, such that investors in the fund now face a higher volatility of the value of their investment. 9 (In this illustration, the external leverage (external debt/ market value of assets) has gone from zero to 20 per cent).
This strategy which increases the leverage of investor's positions in the fund can be rationalized in several ways. First, it is the leverage of their overall portfolio rather than of individual positions which should be of primary concern to investors. Because the strategy involves the return of part of their capital to investors, they are able to reinvest those funds in, for example, risk free debt and thus largely undo the effects on the overall leverage of their portfolio. Second, infrastructure assets have a long duration, and the preferred position of investors in the fund may be for a shorter duration investment, which the strategy of replacing investor funds with external debt achieves. Third, stapled securities with high distribution rates based on return of capital may appeal to investors seeking high investment returns to fund consumption, but psychologically averse to running down their capital. The behavioural finance literature 10 provides similar examples suggesting that investors may regard distributions as "income" rather than returns of capital. The marketing strategy of forecasting high distributions for stapled securities (based on asset revaluations and external borrowings), allied with describing returns of capital as "tax deferred income" caters to that behavioural characteristic. 
Conclusion
While the financial management practices outlined in the previous section are in principle acceptable, they are open to abuse. Asset revaluations may be optimistic.
External leverage may be increased beyond prudent levels and used to pay distributions of income (in addition to returns of capital) at levels which are not justified by returns on the infrastructure assets. Replacing investors' funds with external, short term, debt may enhance external monitoring (by the banks involved) but creates funding risks when those debts need to be rolled over.
Other potential problems can also be identified. Declining asset values, increased debt financing costs, reduced distributions and ongoing media criticism about poor governance arrangements and practices in the infrastructure fund model, have combined to severely depress their stock prices, and raises questions about the future of this innovative form of financing. 12 While, as outlined above, the model is not inherently flawed, fund promoters had been able to exploit inadequate market discipline, limited regulation, and easy credit market conditions, to construct unsuitable fund structures and extract high fee income.
Given the importance of this asset category, both to the functioning of the economy and as an investment class for superannuation funds and other investors, it is important that the faults of the infrastructure fund model be correctly identified and resolved. As argued here, some of the commonly criticized financial management practices are not inherently faulty (although open to abuse), and it would unfortunate if a potentially valuable structure for the financing of infrastructure investments was discarded rather than reformed.
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